TRANSMITTAL SLIP	DATE 26 Nov 84
TO: D/OCA 2D	
ROOM NO.	BUILDING 7D43

REMARKS:

→ Liaison : STAT

FROM:	
ROOM NO.	BUILD

STAT

FORM NO. 1 FEB 55 241 REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED (47)

File: OTA

OLL 84-4440
26 November 1984

DCI *

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/OLL
C/NIC

SUBJECT: Request from the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)

VIA: [redacted] STAT

1. We need a policy decision to respond to OTA's 20 November 1984 request for:

1) access to six publications, including two NIEs, one NIC Memorandum, and one typescript;

2) a third round of briefings with Agency analysts.

2. NIOs Gershwin and Ermarth believe we need top-level guidance in formulating our response. Gershwin is concerned about the sensitivity of the material in the NIC publications. Ermarth feels the NSC should be consulted before dealing further with OTA on this topic.

3. Our dealings with OTA, as with GAO and CRS, are not based on fixed guidelines. We respond to their requests on a case-by-case basis. OTA is a relatively infrequent customer, but it is venturing into new territory by asking for DI and NIC publications.

4. Our analysts are not anxious to spend more time briefing OTA on this topic. Two two-hour sessions were held in August and September. Our requests to OTA for specific topics do not yield the degree of specificity we seek in order to limit the number of briefers that must be involved.

5. There is no easy answer to this problem. If we turn down the request for all or some of the publications, we should have a respectable rationale. We can provide a final briefing, but it will be more palatable to Agency briefers if their participation has been blessed by higher authorities.

[redacted] STAT

* Discussed today with C/NIC — his decision: Brief w/s OK, with appropriate caveats. No document access (OTA customer Committee members do/can have access). If escalates to Ted Stevens, for example, as Vice Chmn OTA Board, will address issue at that time.

CONFIDENTIAL

25X1

[redacted] 27 NOV 1984



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OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

August 10, 1984

STAT

Central Inteligence Agency
Office of Legislative Liaison
Room 7B02
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear STAT

Thank you again for arranging the informative meeting earlier this week on anti-satellite weapons issues between some of our staff and some of your analysts. As you know, the ASAT Technical Memorandum we are working on is part of a larger study of "New Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies," a study requested of OTA by the House Armed Services Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

In carrying out this study, it would be of great help to us to be able to explore the following points with relevant CIA analytic staff:

1) Description of current Soviet BMD (Ballistic Missile Defense) research, development and testing.

2) Likely Soviet policies toward BMD and the ABM Treaty in the absence of any U.S. intitiatives in these areas.

3) Strategic implications of U.S. SDI development and deployment, including political and arms control implications -- specifically for ABM treaty.

4) Plausible Soviet countermeasures to SDI deployment including changes in offensive forces (ballistic missiles, bombers, cruise missiles).

5) Plausible Soviet analogous responses to SDI, such as directed energy system development, conventional Soviet ABM systems.

6) The Soviet record to date on compliance with the ABM Treaty.

7) U.S. capabilities (current and future) for verifying current and possible future arms control agreements on ballistic missile defenses (including national technical means and cooperative arrangements.

I realize that this is a rather full menu of issues, so, if necessary, we are prepared to make more than one visit to cover it. We would appreciate having the first meeting as soon as possible after Labor Day, September 3, 1984. I should add that our ability to keep that appointment is contingent upon final approval of SCI clearances for two of our staff whose applications are

still pending. The members of our staff with current SCI clearances who would probably attend these meetings are as follows:

Dr. Peter Sharfman, Program Manager, International Security and Commerce S1/TK/G
Dr. Thomas Karas, Project Director, New Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies S1/TK/G
Dr. Robert Rochlin, Senior Analyst (his SCI clearances are through the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, from which we have him on detail) S/TK/G

In addition, we would hope that by September the following two people would have received their SCI clearances and would also be able to attend:

Dr. Alan Shaw, Senior Analyst OK - needs brief S/TK
Dr. Gerald Epstein, Analyst.

Should the new clearances not yet have been granted, we would hope that postponement of the meeting to a mutually convenient time could be arranged.

If there are any documents that it would be useful for us to read beforehand, we would appreciate access to them. (I believe that our security officer, Tom McGurn, will be contacting you about arranging for CIA approval of OTA secure storage facilities for non-SCI classified materials.)

Thank you again for your help.

Sincerely,

Tom Karas

Thomas H. Karas

OLL 84-2965/1
7 September 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Briefing for Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) Staffers

1. On 7 September 1984, Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) staffers Peter Sharman, Tom Karas, and Alan Shaw were briefed on the topics listed in their letter (attached) of 10 August 1984. CIA briefers were Larry Gershwin, National Intelligence Officer/Strategic Programs (NIO/SP); [redacted] 25X1
[redacted] ANIO/SP; [redacted], Office of 25X1
Scientific and Weapons Research; and [redacted] 25X1
[redacted] of the Arms Control Intelligence Staff. The briefing 25X1
was conducted at the TS/Codeword level. [redacted] 25X1

2. Mr. Gershwin led off the briefing with an overview of Soviet strategic defense systems. Using vu-graphs, he discussed the rationale and doctrine underlying Moscow's strategic defense program, its protection priorities, its R&D efforts, the Moscow ABM system, and the prospect for ABM deployment nationwide. [redacted] 25X1

3. This presentation was followed by a briefing on directed energy by [redacted] He discussed the relevant 25X1
technology in the USSR and the history of its development. Included in the briefing was discussion of intelligence gaps and problems in analyzing how far along the Soviets might be in developing a space-based laser weapon. [redacted] 25X1

4. Due to lack of time, the arms control aspect of Soviet compliance with existing treaties was not covered. This may be handled at a later date. The OTA staffers expressed appreciation for the two-hour briefing given today.

[redacted] 25X1

Liaison Division
Office of Legislative Liaison

Distribution:
Orig - OLL Record
1 - OLL Chrono
OLL/LD/[redacted] (1 Nov 84)

[redacted] 25X1
25X1

SECRET

OLL 84-3221
7 August 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Briefing for Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) on Ballistic Missile Defense and Antisatellite (ASAT) Technologies

1. On 7 August 1984, OTA staffers Richard DalBello, Michael Callaham, and Thomas Karas were briefed on Soviet ballistic missile defense and ASAT technologies. The briefers were [redacted] (DI/OSWR) and [redacted] (DI/SOVA). The briefing was conducted at the codeword level. [redacted] 25X1 25X1 25X1

2. The attached correspondence describes the nature of the OTA study which led to the briefing. The two-hour session consisted of questions and answers related to Soviet technology and research in the ASAT field. [redacted] 25X1

3. The OTA staffers asked for three CIA reports ([redacted] which are being withheld pending CIA approval of OTA secure storage facilities. The staffers also indicated they would most likely seek an additional CIA briefing. [redacted] 25X1 25X1 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

Liaison Division
Office of Legislative Liaison

Distribution:
Orig - OLL Record
1 - OLL Chrono
1 - DI Subject
1 - DI MFR
OLL/LD/[redacted] (5 Sept 84) 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

CONFIDENTIAL

July 6, 1984

[redacted] 25X1

Office of Legislative Liaison
7B02
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear [redacted] 25X1

Pursuant to our conversation of July 5, I have enclosed copies of the House Armed Services and Senate Foreign Relations letters requesting OTA to study new ballistic missile defense and antisatellite (ASAT) technologies. Since the purpose of our visit to the CIA will be to obtain information on ASAT technology and policy, I have also included a draft outline of our proposed ASAT technical memorandum and annex. This should give you some idea of how we are approaching the problem and suggest what types of information we might find useful.

If I can be of further assistance please let me know. I look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

Richard DalBello

Enclosures

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Washington, D.C. 20515
NINETY-EIGHTH CONGRESS
MELVIN PRICE (ILL.), CHAIRMAN

March 5, 1984

Dr. John Gibbons
Director
Office of Technology Assessment
U. S. Congress
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Dr. Gibbons:

On March 23, 1983, President Reagan, during his news conference issued a call to the scientific community to focus attention on the means of rendering nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.

Subsequent to the news conference, a National Security Study Directive (NSSD 6-83) called for two studies to explore this initiative. The studies were to:

- Examine the role that defensive system deployments could play in the future security strategy of the free world;
- Develop a long-range research and development program with the objective of developing and validating technologies for militarily effective systems to defend against ballistic missiles.

In response to NSSD 6-83, the Department of Defense convened a special study panel under the direction of Dr. James C. Fletcher, University of Pittsburgh, to perform a detailed analysis of the current and projected state of technology. The study addressed the status of the technology in conventional weapons, directed energy weapons, the ancillary systems—such as command, control and communications and data processing—system concepts, system integration, and countermeasures and tactics. As a consequence of this and other studies addressing defensive systems, the President intends to seek funds for a greatly expanded research and development program, which has been referred to as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

The research and development choices in the SDI will be particularly difficult. However, an even more difficult problem arises from the likelihood that a major research and development effort could lead to the deployment of systems that will affect our national security. The effort could affect how the Soviets view the U. S. military posture and, hence, generate a Soviet reaction to the SDI. There is also a possible impact on strategic arms control to include the START negotiations, the prospects for a treaty

limiting anti-satellite weapons and the viability of the ABM treaty of 1972. Still another important question is whether a deployment would tend to make the strategic balance and any concommitant international crisis more or less stable.

Accordingly, I request that your office undertake an assessment of the technologies delineated in the Fletcher Commission report as well as the ancillary issues that I have identified above. I am hopeful that your office could address the following three critical questions:

1. What actual capabilities—and in what time frame—can reasonably be expected of each of the technologies under consideration and which of these expectations are uncertain? I would strongly urge your office to coordinate closely with members of the Fletcher Commission to respond to this question as well as the questions arising from the countermeasures the Soviets might be expected to employ.

2. What, in the judgment of your office, would be the relationship between capabilities that can reasonably be expected and the impact of the technology exploitation effort on the overall strategic policy of the United States? This analysis should, if possible, include the impact of a deployed system on deterrence, crisis stability, arms control and on national security policy.

3. In view of this analysis, what policy options would be created for the United States?

I recognize that most of your analysis on this subject will be done on a classified basis. However, it would be helpful if as much of the findings as possible could be presented in an unclassified form.

Sincerely,

Melvin Price
Chairman

William L. Dickinson
Ranking Minority Member

Les Aspin
Member of Congress

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 20, 1984

Dr. John H. Gibbons
Director
Office of Technology Assessment
United States Congress
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Dr. Gibbons:

The Committee on Foreign Relations has conducted a series of hearings on the security and arms control implications of space-based and space-directed weapons, including anti-satellite weapons. The Committee subsequently unanimously approved S.J. Res. 129, which calls for an immediate, mutual and verifiable moratorium of limited duration on ASAT tests, immediate resumption of ASAT talks, and a comprehensive, verifiable treaty banning space-based or space-directed weapons.

As a complement to the Committee's hearings, the Office of Technology Assessment conducted a space arms control workshop and will soon publish a background paper on ballistic missile defense.

Based upon this earlier work, we believe that Congress would greatly benefit from an independent and thorough assessment of relevant technologies and their political and strategic implications. Accordingly, we are requesting that the Office of Technology Assessment continue its efforts in this area by undertaking an independent assessment of the following issues;

--the feasibility, effectiveness and cost of various space-based or space-directed concepts--whether to provide an anti-satellite weapons capability, limited defense of military assets or an overall defense of the nation;

--the implications of a major research and development program for space weapons--prior to a definite decision on whether to deploy such weapons--for crisis stability, the U.S.-Soviet arms competition, U.S. alliances, and existing arms control agreements.

--the possible effect of such weapons upon the viability of the U.S. military structure, including space-based assets.

--the likely consequences of such deployments on strategic stability, including the effect upon crisis management and upon the decision to engage in warfare;

--the implications of anti-satellite weapons and space-based or space-directed missile defense concepts for standing arms control agreements, particularly the Anti-Ballistic Missile, Outer Space and Limited Test Ban Treaties; and,

--the prospects for future space-related arms control agreements, including an assessment of advantages, disadvantages and verifiability.

We want to thank you very much for the excellent work done on the issue to date under OTA auspices and, in advance, for the valuable help to the Congress you and your staff will be rendering with the new assessment.

With every good wish.

Sincerely,

Charles H. Percy
Chairman

Claiborne Pell
Ranking Member

Larry Pressler
U.S. Senator

Paul E. Tsongas
U.S. Senator